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Approved for public release; distribution is 


Distribution authorized to U.S. Gov't, agencies 
and their contractors; 

Administrative/Operational Use; 27 MAR 1970. 
Other requests shall be referred to Army 
Concept Team in Vietnam, APO San Francisco, CA. 


OACSFOR ltr, 13 Sep 1973 





AD 868942 


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This document i. sue - be 

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APO San Francisco 9638U 

27 March 1970 

Interim Letter Report - XM191 Multishot Portable Flame 
Weapon - ENSURE 263 (ACG-2U/69I) 



Commanding General 
United States Army, Vietnam 
APO 96375 



: nn njEJnl 

a. Letter, AVDE-GT-T, HQ 9th Inf Div, 28 August 1968, subject: Re¬ 
quest for Flame Weapon to Neutralize Bunker Positions (U), Confidential. 

b. Message, AVHGC-DST, HQ USARV 71 * 375 , 1*» October 1968, subject: 

Tong Range Flame Weapon (ENSURE (U), Confidential. 

c. Message, DA 887885 , 20 November 1968, subject: Long Range Flame 
Weapon (ENSURE 263). 

d. DF, AVHGC-DST, HQ USARV, 16 May 1969 , subject: Evaluation of the 
XM191 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon (MPFW) System (U), Confidential. 

e. Message, AVHGC-DST, HQ USARV, 63293, 23 May 1969, subject: XM191 
Multishot Portable Flame Weapon (MPFW) (U), Confidential. 

f. Message, AVHGC-DST, HQ USARV, 831U8, 21 September 1969 , subject: 
XM191 Multishot Portable Flame Weapon (ENSURE 263) (U), Confidential. 




f'*l< « 


to determine the effectiveness and suitability of the XM191 Multishot 
Portable Flame Weapon (MPFW) in the combat environment of the Republic of 
Vietnam (RVK). 



a. Objective 1. To evaluate the operational performance of the XM191 



b. Objective 2. To document tactical employment doctrine developed 
from field use of the XM191 MPFW. 

c. Objective 3. To determine the user acceptability and suitability 
of the XIII91 MPFW. 

d. Objective k. To determine the adequacy of technical documentation 
and truining guidance for the operation of the XM191 MPFW. 


The general requirement for a weapon capable of firing an encapsulated 
flame round at targets to ranges of 100 meters or greater was stated by 
the UC Marine Corps in October 1966- A specific requirement for a flame 
weapon to neutralize bunker positions when fired from standoff ranges of 
200 meters or more was stated by the 9th Infantry Division in August 1968, 
resulting in approval of ENSURE 263. The weapon developed combines a 
warhead containing a pyrophoric (spontaneously igniting) compound with the 
rocket motor and other components of the M72 Light Antitank Weapon (LAW) 
system. This item has been designated the XM191 Multishot Portable Flame 
Weapon (MPFW). A Joint Army/Marine team demonstrated the weapon in RVN 
during February - March 1969. All organizations attending the demonstra¬ 
tions indicated a high level of interest. 


The XM191 MPFW system consists of the lightweight, shoulder-fired, 
four-tube, semi-automatic, 66mm, XM202 rocket launcher (Figures la A b) 
and- the factory-loaded, four-round XM7 1 * rocket clip (Figure 2). The 
system, as it appears when it is assembled and ready to fire, is shown 
in Figure 3. The rocket, which is propelled by the M5 1 * LAW motor, has 
a warhead containing 1.3 pounds of thickened triethylaluminum (TPA). 

A complete description, including tabulated data, is contained in an 
annex to this report. 


a. Approach 

The evaluation of the XM3 91 MPFW system was conducted in two 
phases. The first phase, completed in January 1970, consisted of famil¬ 
iarization and training for US Army divisions and separate brigade-size 
units. Concurrently, four units—the kth, 23rd (Americal), and 25th 
Infantry Divisions and the 1st Cavalry Division (AM)—, upon completion 
of training, participated in an interim 90-day evaluation. A second, 
or full-scale, evaluation was conducted by the above units and the 
following additional organizations: 1st Infantry Division; 101st Air¬ 
borne Division (AM); 173d Airborne Brigade; 11th Armored Cavalry Regi¬ 
ment; 199th Light Infantry Brigade; 1st Brigade, 5th Infantry Division 
('lech); and 3d Brigade, 9th Infantry Division. A staggered schedule, 
dictated by the times that launchers and ammunition were received 







in—country and the ability of the UE Army Edgewood Arsenal Hew Equipment 
Training Team (NETT) to provide the required support, was followed. 

b. Data Collection 

The principal data collection agencies within the participating 
organizations were the divisional or brigade chemical sections augmented 
by a noncommissioned officer evaluator. Normally, the chemical sections 
became the unit action offices, and directed the activities of the evalua¬ 
tor. As soon as possible following a reported employment of the weapon, 
the evaluator interviewed the firer and, if possible, the firer's imme¬ 
diate superior. A questionnaire was employed to record the details of 
the action, performance of the weapon and ammunition, and associated 
human factors. As weapons utilization warranted, small unit leaders 
and commanders up to battalion level were interviewed periodically by 
chemical officers and the ACTIV project officer. These planned inter¬ 
views were designed to determine the views of responsible officers and 
NCOs at these echelons regarding acceptability and adequacy of the XM191 
system, and to assist in the development of employment doctrine. 

c. Environment 

The evaluation was conducted in all the major geomorphic regions 
of RVN, including the Northern and Central Coastlands, the Northern High¬ 
lands, the Western Plateau, and the Mekong Terrace. The last named region 
has many of the characteristics of the Mekong Delta. All types of terrain, 
from rice fields through elephant grass savannas to dense triple canopy 
rain forest, were encountered in the evaluation, as well as areas where 
the rocky and broken nature of the topography provided severe tests of 
durability and portability. The northeast monsoon predominated during 
most of the evaluation, causing heavy rainfall and difficult trafficability 
on the Northern and Central Coastlands and Northern Highlands. The Western 
Plateau and Mekong Terrace were generally dry, and provided some opportuni¬ 
ties for secondary fires. 

a. Range and Accuracy 

The preponderance of targets engaged were classified as area targets 
from which enemy fire was received or which were suspected to conceal enemy 
troops. These targets were engaged at ranges varying from 75 meters to 
approximately 700 meters, with the average being about 260 meters. With 
respect to accuracy of fire against area targets, gunners claimed 22 first- 
round hits (a round impacting within 5 meters of the target was defined as 
a hit) out of fired, for a percentage of 65 percent. Few valid conclu¬ 
sions can be drawn, however, as one-fifth of these targets were engaged at 
night; also, the target center of an area target, such as a hedgerow, was 
largely a matter of the firer's opinion. While the number of engagements 


of legitl-atc roint targets, i.e. wear or.3 z ositi 'rn , raves, and bunkers, 
war 1 i~.:, t, v ■" nr;,^r vr.’-j e-i fr-'m ion nr^cr" to I cr > r«“trra, + : <- 

nvoi-tM re*rg o^o t f or** t’-ar. 7° p'-rc^-t of thr rourds fi^ed 

amsirct pcirt targets vcre at r»n*»s of 100 to POO neters. Hsl ng t^e 
criteri” defined above, 7^ percent of the gunners achieved first-round 
h'hr on e^irt. targets. 

V , m a v- ;Tot, Of feet. 

(1 ) "’ho burst radius was approximately 20 meters, except when 
confined by vegetation or terrain, ’’ounds observed to impact in soft, 
or marshy terrain had reduced effectiveness in this respect. 

(2) "Vo confirmed fataliti-s ear. he directly attributed to the 
efforts o' fie weapon at the tir.e ttir rer nrt was prepared. Additionally, 
on rev"rml occasions, enemy soldi ors were observed fleeing from their 
rcsitions with their clothing fcurninr, and pieces of individual equipment 
were found turnin'- at the scene o'* the action. In several engagement s, 
enemy troops were killed or wounded by other weapons after they were 
forced from corcealment or cover by the flame rounds. "Tie psychological 
impact of the weapon appeared to be considerable, as enemy activity 
invariably ceased after employment of the flame rounds. After a multiple 
round firing, users made statements such as "The entire interior of the 
cave war one vail of flames" and "The entire hedgerow was set afire and 
the TfM cane out and we engaged then with other weapons." Tn general, 
during the dry season in the Mekong ’"’errace region, secondary fires were 
easily started, which materially enhanced the effectiveness of the weapon 
ir. the reconnaissance-by-fire role. The same applied to bamboo and grass 
structures when they were attacked. 

c . deliability 

In the course of the interim evaluation, there were no incidents 
of launcher malfunction during combat firing or during the training 
provided by the Edgewood Arsenal. f.'ET team. Out of a total of 25** fielded 
to date, 3 launchers have been evacuated to CONUS for repair and return 
for defects discovered during initial inspection upon receipt. All three 
launchers had defective trigger mechanisms. The trigger either failed to 
return properly, or required excessive pressure to function. Tn addition, 
during unit training conducted in the 1st Cavalry Division (AM), the detent 
pin on the clip lock assembly of one launcher failed, rendering the launcher 
unserviceable. "Tiis was the only field failure since the weapon system 
was deployed in late October 19*’“. Experience with the XM7** rocket clips 
and rounds was better than that realized with the launcher. No duds were 
reported in 238 rounds fired in combat, and only 7 duds were recorded 
among 6U0 rounds fired in the training activities of the NETT. The over¬ 
all dud rate based on documented firings is 0.8 percent. Tn addition 
three misfires, in which the rocket motor failed, have been reported. 



from ^ield urr of up xrioi mpfvT 

a. Tyres of Units 

Organizations particij atir.g in the interim evaluation distributed 
the available weapons (?U to 30 within each division) among a variety of 
subordinate units, including: 

(1) Infantry and mechanized infantry companies. 

(2) Divisional cavalry troops. 

(3) Aero-rifle platoons of air cavalry. 

( h) Miscellaneous headquarters-controlled elements, i.e., anti¬ 
tank platoons, U.2 inch mortar sections, chemical sections, 

b. Types of Operations 

The operations of smaller units were primarily tactical sweeps 
or interdiction and ambush missions. Although bunker complexes and 
similar positions were encountered with some frequency, the standoff 
tactics used during the evaluation emphasized the employment of heavy 
support weapons to accomplish the neutralization mission. Consequently, 
the number of conventional assault-type operations, in which MPFW would 
be most useful, was drastically reduced. Furthermore, the nature of 
normal operations of dismounted infantry units in the Vietnam combat 
environment was not conducive to carrying the weapons in the manner of an 
organic, crew-served weapon [see Paragraphs 8e and 9b(l)]. However, on 
a trial basis, some units carried the MPFW on short-range patrols. 

Mounted units, i.e. mechanized infantry or cavalry units, carried the 
weapon as a part of the normal combat load and employed it frequently; 
most MPFW usage was by these units . 

c. Command and Control 

As a result of the low density and novelty of the weapon, tactical 
control was frequently exercised at a higher echelon than normal. Company 
commanders, rather than platoon or squad leaders, often selected targets 
or positioned the weapon. As additional numbers of weapons are fielded, 
it is likely that employment will be decentralized to platoon or squad 

d. Tactics and Techniques 
(1) General 

Although combat employment of the XM191 MPFW system during 
the interim evaluation period was limited, it provided some indication 


of the ultimate missions and employment techniques for the weapon. The 
primary role of the weapon, and the one for which it was designed, is 
the neutralization and/or destruction of hunkers and other manned fighting 
positions. However, the current nature and level of combat operations in 
RVh! modified the expected patterns of usage and tactics. Missions to date 
have included: 

(a) Attack of bunkers, caves, and weapons positions, i.e. 
point targets. 

(b) Attack of covered and/or concealed area targets. 

(c) Reconnaissance by fire. 

(d) Fire base defense. 

(e) Other operations. 

(2) Point Targets 

Although infrequently engaged, compared to other targets, 
roint targets , such as caves on the mountain Nui Ba Den in Tay Ninh 
Province and in the rocky hills surrounding the Bong Son Plain in Binh 
Dinh Province, were attacked using the MPFW system. In these instances, 
the weapon was conventionally employed in support of rifle squads search¬ 
ing for enemy hiding places or to suppress sniper fire from enemy posi¬ 
tions. On one occasion enemy supporting weapons, including a light mortar 
and a recoilless rifle, were engaged and silenced. 

(3) Area Targets 

Wooded areas, hedgerows, and areas of high grass concealing 
enemy troops were effectively attacked several times. The tactic used in 
these instances was to place flame over a wide area and force the enemy 
to abandon his position, thereby subjecting himself to fire from other 

(U ) Reconnaigsanee-by-fire 

Reconnaissance-hy-fire of possible enemy hiding places by 
means of the flame round was the most frequent node of employment. On 
ore o-casior., troops were reluctant to enter a dense bamboo and brush, 
hedgerow, ever after it had beer swept with snail arms and automatic 
weapons fire; however, after eight flame rnurds had beer: fired along 
the lenrth of the hedgerow, troops entered the position with 
Tn the cited instance, an enemy weapons and supply cache was located. 

(.5) Pise Defense 

Commanders visualized usinr the XT'l^l ,r PFW ir. this role 
r its rsychological effect, as well as capitalizing on the fact that 

the low explosive power of the rocket warhead would minimize the damage 
to wire entanglements while disabling and/or repelling infiltrators. 
Employment in this manner was not reported; however, enemy attacks by 
fire from ranges out to 700 meters were effectively countered. 

(6) Q*h er Operations 

One instance was reported in which the XM191 MPFW was used 
on a night ambush position. The weapon was fired at suspected enemy move¬ 
ment, but no results were determined. Several firings were made at night 
based on radar fightings from night defensive positions. In all cases 
movement ceased after employment of the weapon. Commanders also attempted 
to capitalize on the added psychological effect of the flame rocket at night 
by firing on likely approach routes of enemy reconnaissance elements. 

e. Effects of Environment 

The physical environment of RVN had a significant effect on tactical 
employment of the XM191 MPFW. The conspicuous lack of firing data on re¬ 
duction of bunkers was a partial result of the frequent enemy practice of 
selecting the most densely forested areas in which to construct his permanent 
fighting positions. Frequently, bunker complexes were not located until friend 
ly troops were virtually on top of or among the bunkers. In close terrain of 
this nature, the minimum range restriction, intervening vegetation, and back 
blast clearance requirements drastically reduced the utility of the weapon. 

At the interim stage of the evaluation no pattern of deleterious effects on 
components of the launcher attributable to the effects of the environment were 

f. Basis of Issue 

Although the current evaluation basis of issue is one per company-size 
unit, nearly all commanders recommended a basis of issue of one per platoon. 

Wo direct field comparisons were made with the standard portable flame throw¬ 
ers, but, at this point in the evaluation, two divisions recommend replace¬ 
ment of these items with the XM202 rocket launcher on at least a one-for-one 
basis. A basis of issue will be recommended upon completion of the full 


a. Requirement 

(1) Utilization 

The number of combat employments of the MPFW during the interim 
evaluation period was low, consistent with the general level of combat activity- 
in recent months. Four divisions have participated during at least a portion 
of the interim evaluation period. These organizations, with an intial 
aggregate of ll *5 weapons, reported a total 


of 38 engagements of known or suspected enemy targets. The combat expen¬ 
diture rate per division averaged 10.7 rounds or It.7 clips per month (0.017 
rounds/launcher/day ). Ammunition expended in training or demonstrations 
was not included in the above figures. Only 26 percent of the targets en¬ 
gaged could be considered as point targets, the majority of firings were, 
against area targets such as hedgerows, wood-lines, and similar known or 
likely hiding places of the enemy. The predominant utilization during the 
interim period was reconnaissance by fire on suspected enemy locations; 
generally these were later found to be unoccupied. Point targets engaged 
wore, for the greater part, caves or positions located in rocky crevices 
in hilly terrain from which fire was received or where enemy activity was 
reported. Approximately 20 percent of the combat usage occurred at night. 
Those fircr were largely defensive in nature and were based on visual or 
ground radar sightings. 

( 2 ) User Opinion 

From the incejtion of the evaluation, commanders were generally 
enthusiastic about the possibilities for combat employment of the XM191 
'lPFV. Interviews and unit reports indicated that all organizations currently 
employing the weapon, and those in the process of receiving it, recognized 
a definite need for a flame capability in a weapon of long range and which 
was simple to support logistically. 

b. D esign Features 

(1) W eight and Configuration 

The weight and configuration of the predominantly fiberglass 
and aluminum XM191 'iPFW provided improved portability over most crew—served 
or support type weapons. However, in the physical environment of Vietnam 
most dismounted infantry soldiers thought the weapon was too heavy and 
bulky to carry as an integral squad or platoon weapon. Foot soldiers, 
already burdened with 1*0 to 60 pounds of equipment, were understandably 
reluctant to carry an additional 26 -pound load; most commanders concurred 
in this view. 

(2) Ease of Operation 

Initial impressions gained during training were that the 
operating sequences of preparing the weapon to fire, reloading, and re¬ 
turning it to carrying configuration were awkward to perform. Repetitive 
performance of these steps in training by soldiers resulted in greatly 
improved speed. The first and second times through, the prepare-to-fire 
sequence usually took about one minute. With five or six repetitions, 
times dropped to 20 or 30 seconds for the average gunner. As expected, 
opening the front cover, rotating the handle, and engaging the latch that 
releases the trigger handle assembly, was the most awkward and time-consum¬ 
ing step in the sequence, particularly for men with short arms. 


The single design feature most commented upon was the reflect¬ 
ing sight, originally designed for the 3.5-inch rocket launcher. If the 
available light was poor, it was extremely difficult for the firer to dis¬ 
tinguish the sight reticle. The sight developed for future production 
models should not have this drawback. Night firings served to emphasize 
the fact that the existing sight was virtually useless after dark; conse¬ 
quently, night firings were conducted by estimation. If this usage pattern 
continues, development of a reticle illumination system will be indicated. 

(*») Durability 

Damage to the launcher and ammunition resulting from field 
activities was minimal during the interim evaluation. Two launchers were 
rendered unserviceable during an operation because they were dropped approx¬ 
imately 5 meters from a helicopter onto rocky terrain. The damage in both 
instances consisted of cracks in the fiberglass tubes. 

(5) Trigger Mechanism 

Although no reports of malfunction have been received from 
the field, three launchers were found to have faulty trigger mechanisms 
upon initial inspection by the NETT. The trigger and trigger linkage 
proved to be components of the system readily subject to malfunction, 
e.g., sticking, excess play, or failure to return properly. This is ar 
area that should be considered in product improvement efforts. 

c. Safety 

(1) Desirable Features 

The triply redundant features of the safety button, front 
cover interlock system, and safety guide tube provided adequate protection 
against inadvertent firing of the launcher prior to the completion of the 
prepare-to-fire sequence. The simple clip latch and spring-actuated re¬ 
traction of the firing pin mechanism provided a simple and positive means 
of rendering the launcher safe for extraction of the ammunition clip in 
the event of malfunction. The location of the rocket primers, recessed 
within the clip manifold, provided a high assurance against accidental 
ignition of a rocket motor by means other than the firing pin. 

(2) Undesirable Features 

Two aspects of the trigger safety button were commented 
upon by users. It was noted that the direction of movement between the 
"Safe" and "Fire" positions was opposite to that of most weapons, with 
forward being "Safe" and rearward "Fire." This could result in a failure 
to safe the weapon after firing, and thus produce a hazardous condition 


on a subsequent preparation-for-firing sequence. The second problem area 
involved two reported incidents of the safety button vibrating off the 
"Safe" position after the veapons were transported for a period of time 
in tracked vehicles. The frequency with which the weapon is likely to be 
transported in this manner warrants correction of this potential safety 

(3) Accidents 

During the evaluation one serious accident was investigated. 

A launcher fired while attempts were being made to retract the clip into 
the launcher. The launcher was destroyed due to the tactical situation, 
so the exact mechanical cause of the accident, if any, could not be deter¬ 
mined. Two operating personnel were injured because, contrary to safety 
instructions, portions of their bodies were in the rocket motor back- 
blast area of the weapon. Increased safety consciousness was stressed 
during the remainder of the training program. 

d. Logistics 

A major factor contributing to the acceptability of the XM191 
MPFW was the simplification of the logistics that were associated with 
flame operations in the past. Freedom from fuel mixing and pressuriza¬ 
tion requirements was a clear advantage from the inception of the evalua¬ 
tion. Transportation and storage of the XM7 1 * incendiary rocket clips 
through normal in-eountry ammunition channels proved to be trouble-free. 
Care and cleaning requirements proved simple and considerably less demand¬ 
ing than with other weapons systems. 


a. Training 

(l) Formal Program 

Initial instruction on the XM191 MPFW was presented to the 
divisions participating in the evaluation by the Edgewood Arsenal NETT. 
Instruction was based upon the Program of Instruction (POI) published by 
the New Equipment Training Section of the Weapons Development and Engineer¬ 
ing Laboratories of Edgewood Arsenal. This program consisted of 12 hours 
of instruction, broken into 5 hours of lecture and demonstration and 7 
hours of practical exercises, including dry and live firing of the system. 
This POI was tailored for a class of about 12 students, and employed two 
instructors/demonstrators. Two launchers and inert XM7h rocket clips were 
the primary training aids. While this program represented an ideal plan, 
it had to be modified considerably at times to accommodate varying class 
sizes, training time available, and operational considerations. Normally, 
the composition of the classes consisted of three-fourths enlisted oper¬ 
ators in grades E2 to Bl*, the balance of the class being commissioned and 

non-commissioned officers. The latter group received the instruction in 
preparation for future training at the unit level, and to apprise them¬ 
selves of the capabilities of the system. 

(2) Observations 

It became apparent that there were two key aspects of a 
training program for the XM191 MPFW: (l) The amount of practical exer¬ 
cise, including dry firing, and ( 2 ) the number of practice rounds a gunner 
should fire to be considered qualified with the weapon. As discussed in 
Paragraph 9b(2), considerable drill was required before a gunner acquired 
the proper dexterity in the loading, firing, and unloading sequences of 
the system. Observations indicated that from one to two hours of repeti¬ 
tive practice were necessary to develop the requisite skills. Despite 
the commonality of many components of the XM202 launcher with the M72 LAW 
system, the two were sufficiently dissimilar in operating procedures to 
require distinct training programs. The XM191 MPFW training program re¬ 
flected the increased complexity of the weapon. The formal POI employed 
by the NETT required each gunner to fire two rounds for qualification. 
Gunners that subsequently fired the weapon in combat stated that they 
felt qualified after firing from one to eight rockets, with the average 
being three. No attempt was made to correlate the number of first-round 
hits achieved in combat with the number of rockets fired ir. training 
because of the many variables involved in the combat environment. Obsrr- 
vatiors of firings during training indicated that th*- average gunner could 
score neeeptable hits on targets at ranges from 100 to 200 meters with the 
seccnd round fired. With increased availability of ammunition, it would 
probably be desirable for each gunner to fire an entire clip (four rounds) 
in training; the first few rounds overcomes the normal, initial apprehen¬ 
sion - , subsequent rounds build the runner's confidence in the veapon and 
in his ovr. ability to fire it accurately. 

h. Training Ammunition 

Early ir the training activities, it was apparent that a require¬ 
ment existed for inert training ammunition. The nature of the launcher 
mechanism and functioning cycles required a rocket clip or facsimile that 
would retain the firing pin mechanism assembly in the rearward position 
and permit the normal firing cycle to occur. Likewise, the sequences of 
preparation-for-firing, unloading, and the hangfir^-misfire-mecharical 
delay procedures, all required an inert clip for realistic practice. A 
spent (fired) rocket clip could be rapJoyed for this purpose, but there 
was a considerable risk of damage to the launcher tubes. The sharp edg°s 
of the aluminum rocket tubes were likely to scratch the interior of the 
fiberglass launcher tubes, particularly following repetitive use. This 
practice could render the launcher unserviceable. Inert clips provided 
to units by the NETT sufficed for the interim evaluation period; however, 
a basis of issue remains to be determined. 

Technical Documentation 

The technical manual, TM 3-1055-218-12, both in draft form and 
as a formal DA publication, were Judged to be adequate during the period 
of the interim evaluation. All respondents have indicated satisfaction 
with the format and content of these documents. 


a. Conclusions 

Tentative conclusions based on the 90-day interim evaluation are: 

(1) The XM191 MPFW possesses adequate range, accuracy, and tar¬ 
get effect to engage and neutralize a variety of targets. 

(2) The XM202 rocket launcher and XM7 1 * rocket are reliable under 
field conditions. 

(3) The weapon system is capable of performing a much wider 
variety of tactical missions than standard portable flame weapons. 

(U) The utility of the XM191 MPFW is limited in dense Jungle 
terrain by minimum range restrictions. 

(5) Commanders generally agree on the need for a weapon of 
this type. 

(6) Dismounted infantry consider the weapon too bulky and heavy 
to carry regularly on extended operations. 

(7) Logistical support and maintenance of the XM191 MPFW are 


(8) The XM191 MPFW is considerably more complex than the M72 
LAW system, and consequently requires a more extensive training program. 

(9) A requirement exists for inert training ammunition. 

b. Recommendations 

Based on the limited conclusions, it is recommended that: 

(1) The evaluation be continued as scheduled. 

(2) Procurement of the XM191 MPFW be continued. 

(3) . Product improvement efforts toward simplification of weapons 
system operation be continued. 

(U) Preliminary procurement plans be formulated to provide inert 
training ammunition on a basis to be determined. 

2 Inclosures 

1. Annex A 

2. Annex B 


C. B. McCold 
Colonel, IN 


Ainrex a 


1 . omegiT^TOH 

a. General 

The major components of the XM191 MPFW are the Launcher, Rocket: 
''''■mm, Multishot, XM202, referred to as the XV202 rocket launcher, and 
the Rocket, Incendiary: 66 nm, TPA, U-Round Clip, XM74, referred to as 
the X’ , 7 I * incendiary rocket clip. 

b. XM202 Pocket Launcher 

The launcher component of the XM191 system consists of 4-66mm 
fiberglass tubes arranged tvo-by-tvo and secured by bulkheads at both 
ends (see Figure la).^- The firing pin mechanism is located in the center 
of the tube cluster. The trigger - handle assembly is attached to the 
forward end of the launcher. In its carrying configuration, front and 
rear covers seal the launcher against dirt and moisture (see Figure lb). 

The front cover also serves to unlatch and permit extraction of the 
trigger - handle assembly from the body of the launcher where it retracts 
in the carrying configuration. The rear cover protects the firing pin 
mechanism assembly. A reflecting-type sight and carrying sling are 
mounted on the left, side r/ the launcher (see Figure 3). 

c . y *71 pneend i ary p ocket Flip 

'"he reckct clip consists of four aluminum tuber, bourd together by 
a star shared manifold (see Figure 2). Each tube is preloaded with c. C ( '~r. 
rochet, '"he tubes are grouped in the same two-by-two pattern os the XM20? 
rocket launcher and slip-fit into the launcher tubes. Each, rocket consists 
of a warhead which cortair.s 1.3 pounds of thickened tri ethyl aluminum ("’PA), 
and ar M 54 rocket motor. The thickened triethylaluninum ignites spontane¬ 
ously when exposed to air. The rocket fuze is a base-detonating, non-delay- 
action type. Tt arms after the rocket has traveled a minimum of 5.? meters 
and a maximum of 13 meters. 

d. Op eration 

The rocket launcher is fired from the right shoulder usino ary of 
the standard firing positions. Tt is used to neutralize both point and 
area targets. It is semi-automatic, and capable of firing ■"rom one to 
four incendiary rockets at a rate of more than one round per second. It. 
can be reloaded with, a new rochet clip in approximately 30 seconds. After 
arming, deceleration on impact activates the rocket fuze, initiating tie 
detonator .and the primacord burster in turn. On open terrain the incendi- 
ary toa is di sseminated in burning droplets over a 20 -meter radius. 

1. Figure references indicate the appropriate figures given at Sectic*' G, 
>scr 1 j tier . 


3 ^3* r»f 1 n.uncbe** 

V/ei pht of XM7*i elir viti. rockets 
Weight of XVI93 *!PFV? 

T.cnmth, closed 

L,er~t> , extended vith clip 

"uzzlr. velocit 

°an~e, maximum 

Pange, effective for point targets 
Operatin'; temperature limits 

11.5 pounds 

15.1 pounds 

Pfi.6 rounds 

?7.0 inches 

3^.75 inches 

350 feet per second 

730 meters 

200 meters 

3?° _ il*c° F 

A -?